As diplomatic breakthroughs go, the second coming of Barack Obama to India during his presidency, this time at the personal initiative of Narendra Modi, is hardly in the same league as Richard Nixon's path-breaking trip to Communist China in 1972.
However, there is a parallel. The Nixon trip to China happened at the peak of the US-Soviet Union cold war, and the handshake with Mao Zedong was thus a tilting factor in the balance of power at that time.
The Obama visit to India comes at a time when China is the projected second superpower, both economically and militarily, making it necessary for the US to seek a tilting factor in the power balance. India is the obvious choice in that role.
Yesterday (25 January), Obama and Modi announced an agreement to operationalise the Indo-US nuclear deal by side-stepping India's nuclear liability law (with a Rs 1,500 crore insurance pool) and unveiling a purported US concession to India (on not tracking the nuclear fuel used by India beyond what we have already agreed to).
But the nuke deal is just for optics. Despite the fog surrounding the actual details of the deal (who knows what the fine print says), it is unlikely to have a major impact on the ground for the simple reason that worldwide nuclear power has become a matter of concern rather than hope after the Fukushima disaster in Japan.
Even though India is sure to pursue some nuclear power projects for the sake of energy balance, it is unlikely to become a major thrust area, not least because of the local opposition we are already beginning to witness in places where projects are already underway - in Kudankulam (Tamil Nadu, with Russian help) and Jaitapur (with French help).
Given the sheer density of population centres, and the unsuitability of some places due to tectonic activity, nuclear power will not have the kind of importance that Manmohan Singh claimed was the raison d'etre for the Indo-US nuclear deal. The one thing we wanted to achieve - acceptance as a nuclear power - is de facto achieved.
So, clearly, the symbolism of breaking the logjam over the nuclear deal has been more important than the actual results achievable on the ground. The nuclear deal was becoming irrelevant even during Manmohan Singh's time as it got overtaken by events. The BJP spiked the possibility of any immediate gains by forcing the UPA to legislate a prohibitive liability bill. The side-stepping of that bill under the Modi-Obama agreement will thus do little to change things, even though it does open the way for suppliers to take part in nuclear projects that are already underway.
Therefore, the real significance of the Obama visit lies more in what it signals geopolitically and what it promises for the future in terms of a closer relationship with the world's Numero Uno power. But the psychic change in the relationship is almost as important as the actual changes it heralds on the ground, for it breaks - hopefully once and for all - the extreme mistrust that has characterised the relationship between the world's oldest democracy and the world's biggest.
The mistrust began almost from 1947 with the politico-economic path chosen by our first rulers. Since then, and almost till 1991, India has been ruled by politicians who have been more comfortable with Russia and the European Left than with American capitalism. In part, this was because of the ideological hold of the Nehruvian elite, the Marxist-Left intellectual, and the need to pander to our own minorities, which called for an overt association with causes inimical to American interests (from Palestine to state-sponsored socialism).
This ideological tilt began correcting itself during Narasimha Rao's regime in the early 1990s, and has been steadily progressing towards a more sensible balance for over two decades. It received a boost during Vajpayee's regime, but during Manmohan Singh's 10-year reign, the signals got mixed: they were positive from the Prime Minister himself, but ambivalent from the Congress party's top leadership.
Obama's visit is confirmation that India has corrected the balance, even though India retains its old ties to Russia and Iran - both of whom have been in the bad books of the US for some time now. The rise of the cultural right in India under Narendra Modi seals this balance further. This is why even an Obama, suspicious of Modi in the past, put aside his own doubts and decided to play ball.
India is now a full player in the global power balance, and this is no small gain, even though it does not appear like a tangible benefit. In the US, Obama's outreach to India has bipartisan support, unlike in the case of Pakistan, which is now the universal pariah whose friendship has to be endured for minor anti-terror help to the west.
The second point to make is what the Obama visit signifies for the future - in terms of closer military, security and business collaboration between the two countries.
Modi's Make in India policy may or may not take off in some of the sectors highlighted, but defence is one area where it certainly will. While 49 percent FDI in defence may not excite too many high-tech American manufacturers immediately, it will attract European, Japanese and Israeli manufacturers to India. Once they break ranks, the US will not want to be left behind. At some point, Modi will surely allow 51 percent ownership in high-tech defence industries in India. A high level of political congruence is needed for this to happen, and Obama's visit indicates that India and the US are ending decades of mistrust by collaborating in defence.
A third area where India and the US will surely collaborate is anti-terror intelligence and homeland security. This is an area of extreme congruence of interests, as both the US and India see themselves as targets of worldwide jihad and Islamic terrorism. The collaboration in this sphere will not be visible to the world, but it will be significant.
The fact that the joint statement yesterday specifically mentioned Pakistan-based terror as an important area of concern is significant. It signals the end of past US efforts to balance India's concerns with Pakistan's. That phase of hyphenation was dying, and is probably now dead. The US no longer feels the need to placate Pakistan beyond a point, even though it will not abandon Pakistan altogether because of its geographical vantage point next to Afghanistan and central Asia. But there is little doubt that the US trusts India more than Pakistan, as indicated by the naming of several Pakistan-based terrorist outfits in the joint statement, and the promises of collaboration in homeland security.
Where Indian and US interests will not be easily reconciled are areas like trade in services (IT manpower), protection of IPR (especially in drug patents), and things like that.
But here it is pertinent to point out that all countries have divergent interests in trade. They fight over it repeatedly, but this does not reduce the overall quality of a relationship. The European Union and China also have trade disputes with the US, and these will continue as long as each region has its own commercial interests. So these disputes will not cast a shadow over the larger India-US relationship.
The key takeout from the Obama-Modi chemistry is the end of the political mistrust of the Cold War era at a time when China is rapidly emerging as the new global superpower. This is not a small gain, for trade and other gains usually follow political warmth.
However, there is a parallel. The Nixon trip to China happened at the peak of the US-Soviet Union cold war, and the handshake with Mao Zedong was thus a tilting factor in the balance of power at that time.
The Obama visit to India comes at a time when China is the projected second superpower, both economically and militarily, making it necessary for the US to seek a tilting factor in the power balance. India is the obvious choice in that role.
Yesterday (25 January), Obama and Modi announced an agreement to operationalise the Indo-US nuclear deal by side-stepping India's nuclear liability law (with a Rs 1,500 crore insurance pool) and unveiling a purported US concession to India (on not tracking the nuclear fuel used by India beyond what we have already agreed to).
But the nuke deal is just for optics. Despite the fog surrounding the actual details of the deal (who knows what the fine print says), it is unlikely to have a major impact on the ground for the simple reason that worldwide nuclear power has become a matter of concern rather than hope after the Fukushima disaster in Japan.
Even though India is sure to pursue some nuclear power projects for the sake of energy balance, it is unlikely to become a major thrust area, not least because of the local opposition we are already beginning to witness in places where projects are already underway - in Kudankulam (Tamil Nadu, with Russian help) and Jaitapur (with French help).
Given the sheer density of population centres, and the unsuitability of some places due to tectonic activity, nuclear power will not have the kind of importance that Manmohan Singh claimed was the raison d'etre for the Indo-US nuclear deal. The one thing we wanted to achieve - acceptance as a nuclear power - is de facto achieved.
So, clearly, the symbolism of breaking the logjam over the nuclear deal has been more important than the actual results achievable on the ground. The nuclear deal was becoming irrelevant even during Manmohan Singh's time as it got overtaken by events. The BJP spiked the possibility of any immediate gains by forcing the UPA to legislate a prohibitive liability bill. The side-stepping of that bill under the Modi-Obama agreement will thus do little to change things, even though it does open the way for suppliers to take part in nuclear projects that are already underway.
Therefore, the real significance of the Obama visit lies more in what it signals geopolitically and what it promises for the future in terms of a closer relationship with the world's Numero Uno power. But the psychic change in the relationship is almost as important as the actual changes it heralds on the ground, for it breaks - hopefully once and for all - the extreme mistrust that has characterised the relationship between the world's oldest democracy and the world's biggest.
The mistrust began almost from 1947 with the politico-economic path chosen by our first rulers. Since then, and almost till 1991, India has been ruled by politicians who have been more comfortable with Russia and the European Left than with American capitalism. In part, this was because of the ideological hold of the Nehruvian elite, the Marxist-Left intellectual, and the need to pander to our own minorities, which called for an overt association with causes inimical to American interests (from Palestine to state-sponsored socialism).
This ideological tilt began correcting itself during Narasimha Rao's regime in the early 1990s, and has been steadily progressing towards a more sensible balance for over two decades. It received a boost during Vajpayee's regime, but during Manmohan Singh's 10-year reign, the signals got mixed: they were positive from the Prime Minister himself, but ambivalent from the Congress party's top leadership.
Obama's visit is confirmation that India has corrected the balance, even though India retains its old ties to Russia and Iran - both of whom have been in the bad books of the US for some time now. The rise of the cultural right in India under Narendra Modi seals this balance further. This is why even an Obama, suspicious of Modi in the past, put aside his own doubts and decided to play ball.
India is now a full player in the global power balance, and this is no small gain, even though it does not appear like a tangible benefit. In the US, Obama's outreach to India has bipartisan support, unlike in the case of Pakistan, which is now the universal pariah whose friendship has to be endured for minor anti-terror help to the west.
The second point to make is what the Obama visit signifies for the future - in terms of closer military, security and business collaboration between the two countries.
Modi's Make in India policy may or may not take off in some of the sectors highlighted, but defence is one area where it certainly will. While 49 percent FDI in defence may not excite too many high-tech American manufacturers immediately, it will attract European, Japanese and Israeli manufacturers to India. Once they break ranks, the US will not want to be left behind. At some point, Modi will surely allow 51 percent ownership in high-tech defence industries in India. A high level of political congruence is needed for this to happen, and Obama's visit indicates that India and the US are ending decades of mistrust by collaborating in defence.
A third area where India and the US will surely collaborate is anti-terror intelligence and homeland security. This is an area of extreme congruence of interests, as both the US and India see themselves as targets of worldwide jihad and Islamic terrorism. The collaboration in this sphere will not be visible to the world, but it will be significant.
The fact that the joint statement yesterday specifically mentioned Pakistan-based terror as an important area of concern is significant. It signals the end of past US efforts to balance India's concerns with Pakistan's. That phase of hyphenation was dying, and is probably now dead. The US no longer feels the need to placate Pakistan beyond a point, even though it will not abandon Pakistan altogether because of its geographical vantage point next to Afghanistan and central Asia. But there is little doubt that the US trusts India more than Pakistan, as indicated by the naming of several Pakistan-based terrorist outfits in the joint statement, and the promises of collaboration in homeland security.
Where Indian and US interests will not be easily reconciled are areas like trade in services (IT manpower), protection of IPR (especially in drug patents), and things like that.
But here it is pertinent to point out that all countries have divergent interests in trade. They fight over it repeatedly, but this does not reduce the overall quality of a relationship. The European Union and China also have trade disputes with the US, and these will continue as long as each region has its own commercial interests. So these disputes will not cast a shadow over the larger India-US relationship.
The key takeout from the Obama-Modi chemistry is the end of the political mistrust of the Cold War era at a time when China is rapidly emerging as the new global superpower. This is not a small gain, for trade and other gains usually follow political warmth.
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